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Abstract 
Widespread uneasiness has emerged concerning a perceived slowdown in productivity 
growth. The question posed here is whether our destiny is indeed tied to inexorable 
movements in productivity and innovation, whatever these things may be, or can we build a 
future contingent upon collective choices and guided by human needs and desires?  
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Movements in an economy’s productivity have moved centre stage in public discussion. 
With only slight exaggeration, a broad mainstream consensus on the issues under 
consideration can be outlined as follows: 
 
1. Growth in productivity is ‘everything’. 
 
This consensus, as exemplified by Wolf (2018), asserts that we are in the midst of a 
crisis: ‘We live in an age judged to be one of exciting technological change, but our national 
accounts tell us that productivity is almost stagnant. Is the slowdown or the innovation an 
illusion? If not, what might explain the puzzle? The slowdown, if true, matters. As Paul 
Krugman… argued, “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost 
everything.” Improvements in standards of living depend almost entirely on rising output 
per worker’. The productivity slowdown, Wolf says, is a major explanation for the stagnation 
in real incomes and the pressure for fiscal austerity in high-income countries. A graph is 
presented showing a decline in growth (% pa) in US total factor productivity (TFP) since the 
1970s. Wolf then offers, as a possible explanation, another graph suggesting weak 
investment and declining growth of productivity in, specifically, high tech sectors. ‘Without 
innovation, the rising prosperity of the past two centuries would have been impossible. In 
truth, innovation, not productivity, is almost everything’.  
Wolf’s article, typical of its kind, with its gloomy picture of economic stagnation due to 
lack of innovation, sits somewhat uneasily alongside notions of catastrophic job 
displacement due to the incursions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics (see, for 
instance, Ford,2015), an equally fatalistic vision of the trajectory of economic and social life.  
 
Two further propositions are part of this mainstream consensus: 
 
2. The source of productivity growth is technological innovation (most likely emerging 
from profit-making enterprises); 
 
3. Leading nations need to focus upon, and direct their efforts to, the development of 
high technology sectors. 
 
The response to these three propositions  will unfold below as follows: 
 
1. Productivity, GDP and other economic aggregates are constructed using price 
weights in their calculation, and are thus inextricably tied to a social valuation. The 
focus on productivity is an attempt to find a purely technical, or even objective, 
measure of (actual or potential) material improvement that would obviate the need 
for the making of social choices and confronting conflicts between interests and 
groups in society. This search for a purely technocratic solution (hinting at Pareto-
type improvements) to issues of economic development is a vain pursuit. 
 
2. The widespread influence in contemporary discourse on the role of innovation and 
creative destruction can have a deleterious influence on approaches to economic 
development. It represents a misreading of history and leads to a misguided search 
for technological fixes and forms of techno-nationalism.  
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3. It is false to suggest that we are locked into a ‘there is no alternative’ trajectory due 
to the technologically-driven imperatives of economic and productivity growth. We 
have a range of options open to us and, indeed, will find this process of choice-
making unavoidable.   
 
The central question here is whether our destiny is indeed tied to inexorable 
movements in productivity and innovation, whatever these things may be, or can we 
build a future contingent upon collective choices and guided by human needs and 
desires? 
 
Productivity and social valuation  
The argument presented by Wolf and others thus asserts that increases in productivity – 
in output1 for given levels of input, including human labour – are ‘almost everything’ when 
we wish to explain long term trends in economic growth in the modern period. This 
proposition plays a central, if often implicit role in the ‘rise of west’ literature (Jones, 1981) 
concerning the ascent to supreme power in the past half millennium of western Europe, 
with its focus on scientific and technological achievements (alongside juridical and 
governmental aspects – property rights – said to be unique to the west), as opposed to 
success in enslaving and exploiting non-Europeans and the taking possession of lands and 
resources occupied by them.2 The focus on enhanced productivity, beyond any such role in 
historical analysis or in exculpatory polemics, is linked to the search by economic analysts, 
from as far back as Adam Smith or earlier, for a deep-seated explanation for the wealth of 
nations in terms of such real factors as efficacy in the use of labour (e.g. Smith’s division of 
labour), rather than accounting for a nation’s success by superficial and transitory aspects 
such as the accumulation of gold and silver or, in our day, alterations in governmental 
monetary and fiscal policy. However, even if, for the sake of argument, were we to accept 
this notion of productivity growth as the ultimate cause of overall material improvement, it 
would not in any straightforward way suggest, as we shall see, an economic strategy of 
giving exclusive attention to investment and growth of productivity in sectors deemed high 
tech, or even those perceived to yield high productivity growth rates: for a national 
economy, such an approach would make about as much sense as a chess strategy having a 
primary and immediate focus on attacking the king. The latter strategy, as I have found to 
my chagrin, rarely leads to the desired goal.  
Charting the trajectory of national productivity can be a tricky business. The higher the 
levels of aggregation we are working at, the more we have to rely on financial calculation 
weighted by prices rather than a hand’s-on physical enumeration - we are a long way from 
simply counting how many more widgets are produced with a given amount of labour when 
new widget-making machines are introduced:3 the monthly statistics on movements in coal 
production (in, if I remember, metric tonnes) in my monthly copies of the Soviet journal 
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta seemed to be yielding more useful information (despite quality 
issues even in the case of coal) than the equivalent calculations of growth in the machine 
tool sector, the latter cobbled together in roubles using heaven knows what price weights.  
The national trends in productivity cited above use a measure of TFP, as opposed to 
some calculation of output per unit labour input, to compensate for the fact that, for 
instance, Danish agriculture is bound to look ‘unproductive’ compared with Canadian 
extensive techniques on an output per head calculation, even if its overall efficiency is 
comparable. Total factor productivity growth emerges from statistical regression technique 
and ‘is the component of overall output growth that cannot be explained by accounting for 
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changes in observable labor and capital inputs’. It is therefore, as Moses Abramovitz has 
suggested, a measure of our ignorance. (Brynjolfsson et al., 2017)   
This ignorance manifests itself in various ways in dealing with labour and capital, issues 
which are well covered in the existing literature.4,5 Of particular interest here are the issues 
linked to the complementarity of inputs, which introduce additional difficulties. Thus, 
statistical calculations of TFP growth conclude by showing that it accounts for a certain 
fraction of growth (as do labour and capital). Such a conclusion, however, ‘would be 
misguided’, because ‘it ignores the fact that decisions to invest in physical and human 
capital are themselves likely to depend on TFP growth’, (World Bank, 2000) so that the ex 
post calculations may not be a good guide to the ex ante dynamics of growth.6 For 
developing countries, the process of diffusion and the assimilation of technologies from 
other nations is the major task before them, rather than innovation: the success of South 
Korea, Taiwan and mainland China in adapting world technologies has been linked to their 
prior achievements in education and economic equality (the latter in all cases abandoned at 
later stages) at the time of their respective economic take-offs. Even in an advanced sector 
such agriculture in the present-day US, complementary infrastructural aspects have played a 
central role, with technical change coming primarily from increased innovation through 
public research and improvements in human capital, the latter linked not only to education, 
but to access to health care. (Sabasi and Shumway, 2015) In this case and others, an 
exclusive focus on the technological aspects of innovation and diffusion is likely to be 
dysfunctional. 
The presence of these complementary aspects in the process of economic development 
points to the limits, as we shall see below, of using new technology as a method for by-
passing the necessity for human and physical infrastructural development and ‘leaping over’ 
to a condition of higher productivity. In addition, the presumption embodied in statistical 
tests that the inputs involved are being used in an optimal fashion will distort the values 
attributed to the individual components (Salter, 1969, pp.6-7) and reinforces a mentality of 
relying on a technological fix rather than attempting to correct failures in the context of 
present-day technology. 
In fact, TFP and output per unit labour cost usually move in tandem,7 with only specific 
demographic movements (e.g. an increase in female participation in the US) causing any 
substantial deviation between the two: the worrisome possibility persists that global 
movements in productivity growth, far from explaining movements in per capita GDP, are 
largely registering a quasi-tautological connection.8,9 Such globally-based productivity 
measures, as opposed to those attempting to trace changes in a particular industry or 
sector, also run into the possibility that the causative relation between growth in 
productivity and in per capita GDP moves in the opposite direction. The dominant 
explanations from Wolf and others are ‘supply side’, i.e. slower growth in productivity will 
result in stagnating GDP per capita, but ‘demand side’ explanations exist as well,10 some of 
them associated with mainstream Keynesianism, (Summers, 2014) but rarely crediting an 
older, heterodox literature from Nicholas Kaldor concerned with what he dubbed 
‘Verdoorn’s law’ suggesting that an economy whose GDP is rising rapidly will be observed to 
have accelerating growth in productivity for two reasons: first, in the act of pursuing higher 
levels of production during a phase of rapid growth, an economy or sectors within it will 
develop more efficient techniques in the process, a ‘learning by doing’ effect (anticipating 
endogenous growth notions), and second, such an economy will manifest increases in 
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productivity through the realisation of economies of scale and (in the short run) by making 
fuller use of its otherwise redundant capacity. (McCombie and Spreafico, 2016)  
At least some of the difficulties in measuring globally-based productivity and its 
direction of causation emerge from ambiguities in the interpretation of the GDP measure 
itself – the variable whose growth plays the role of maximand in the standard exposition of 
a relationship between changes in productivity and in GDP. And a reconsideration of GDP 
will inevitably raise questions concerning why precisely we are concerned with declining 
national productivity in the first place. The GDP measure serves multiple functions: it is a 
measure of total economic capacity (hence the journalistic excitement when the GDP of 
China has supposedly surpassed that of the US); a direct measure (in per capita terms) of a 
nation’s welfare or standard of living; it is, lastly, a measure of aggregate demand for the 
purposes of macroeconomic regulation of the economy. Each of these notions gives us a 
different angle on why we might view falling productivity growth to be linked to a crisis.  
First, interpreting falling GDP growth as a slowdown in the expansion of economic 
capacity might indicate that resources (including human labour) are being released at a 
slower rate than heretofore from some sectors that, if successfully reallocated (with the 
maintenance of full employment conditions), would have been available for a range of 
purposes: to generate increases in the consumption of goods and services by the general 
public, to fulfil national political goals such as military expansion, or for ‘good things’ such as 
poverty alleviation. For this latter task especially, the constraint of resources consequent on 
this slowdown is often taken to be a binding one since, as we have seen above, statistical 
procedures presume that existing resources (e.g. labour and capital) are already being used 
efficiently, and in the contemporary political context any significant reallocation of 
resources presently dedicated to serving the needs and desires of the well-off – a 
proportion that has swelled substantially in the past four decades in, especially the US and 
the UK – is considered unthinkable. Thus, ‘it is productivity growth which enables economic 
growth…if we have to devote ever more resources to finding and developing those new 
technologies then we'll end up running out of resources to do so and thus economic growth 
will fail to happen.’ (Worstall, 2016) 
In its second use, as a direct measure (in per capita terms) of a nation’s welfare or 
standard of living, declining productivity growth can be interpreted as resulting in a situation 
in which the capitalist economy is only providing us with new commodities to delight us at a 
declining rate. Robert J. Gordon is perhaps the leading figure suggesting that the large gains 
in labour productivity from the late nineteenth century until the early 1970s in the US will 
not be repeated. (Gordon, 2016) His claims have had a wide reception, since he had been 
practically a lone voice suggesting that the productivity surge of the mid 1990s observed in 
US statistics was less likely a reflection of the widely heralded new economy based on 
computer technology than a transitory phase reflecting largely economy-wide cyclical 
factors and rapid increases in the productivity of the computer industry itself. (Gordon, 
2000) According to him, the low hanging fruit have been picked: the electronics revolution, 
a general purpose technology (GPT), has not yielded, and will not yield the gains to 
productivity and to consumer welfare comparable to the Second Industrial Revolution: ‘The 
inventions of the second industrial revolution between 1870 and 1920 and then between 
1920 and 1970 created the most rapid period of growth in labor productivity experiences in 
American history, bringing an utter change in most dimensions of human life. The inventions 
of the third industrial revolution…entertainment, communication and information 
technology – did not have the same effects on living standards as had electricity, the 
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internal combustion engine, running water, improved life expectancy…and the human 
condition as work hours declined from 60 to 49 hours a week’. Furthermore, ‘we don’t eat 
computers or wear them or drive to work in them or let them cut our hair. We live in 
dwelling units that have appliances much like those if the 1950s and we drive in motor 
vehicles that perform the same functions as in the 1950s, albeit with more convenience and 
safety’. (Gordon, 2016, pp.522, 579) We see here an odd conflation: the discussion is 
dominated by references to productivity growth decline, but the real problem being 
underlined is that of old-fashioned diminishing marginal utility – that innovations in earlier 
periods were just more important to human welfare than twenty-first century tweaks on 
electronic devices (an evaluation that suggests that earlier developments offered more than 
merely higher levels of growth of subjective utility, but were more successful at fulfilling 
fundamental human needs). It would be a mere coincidence if improvements in social 
welfare from technological improvements moved in step with gains in productivity, and 
Gordon (2016, pp.566-7) tries to square the circle by writing that ‘innovation since the 
1970s…has been less broad in its scope than before’. But in fact, ‘technologies might deliver 
substantial utility even if they account for a small share of GDP due to their low relative 
price’, (Brynjolfsson et al., 2017) a stunning example being the discovery that a simple 
solution of salt, sugar and water could serve for the control of diarrhoeal dehydration in 
children (in, especially, poor countries) that has been hailed as one of the great medical 
breakthroughs of modern times. (Ruxin, 1994)  
Perhaps if we are disappointed in the improvements in human welfare that have taken 
place since 1970 we should look elsewhere than declining productivity. In general, 
‘productivity’ appears before us as something which, in principle, can be measured in an 
objective manner. But the social valuation of any productivity-enhancing activity, very much 
like a capital good, is ultimately linked to that of the final output, i.e. consumption, which it 
helps facilitate. The ‘tremendous consumer benefits’ (Byrne et al., 2016) from smartphones, 
Google searches, and Facebook has been carefully calculated ‘using data on time use and 
the opportunity cost of people's time (i.e., the wage)’. (Goolsbee and Klenow, 2016) In the 
end, however, any such exercises in applied Benthamism for evaluating these productivity 
gains are no less subjective (i.e. they embody value judgements) than any other, including 
my own that, seen from the perspective of the forms of world-wide deprivation referenced 
above in the context of childhood dehydration, the application of this general purpose 
technology (GPT) to enhancements of the ‘consumer experience’ should not be valued very 
highly, despite the enormous commitment of talent, energy and resources devoted to their 
development. Whether one agrees or not with this judgement, it highlights the fact that the 
calculation of the social benefits to the introduction of even a multi-purpose GPT such as 
semiconductor-based electronics cannot take place on the basis of an uncontentious, 
objective measurement of how much society’s technological frontier has been extended, 
but only in the context of a crystallisation of societal decisions on the substantive uses made 
of this technology: we then have to attach a value to these uses.  
GDP as a welfare measure raises further issues when considering productivity 
growth. Let us suppose that a national productivity slowdown had indeed been observed in 
aggregate statistics, but has not been successfully located in any particular sector. What if, 
in fact, we were not at all observing a declining productivity growth in individual sectors of 
the economy but an exogenous shift in ‘taste’ to a low productivity sector, as a newly-
endowed super rich class indulges in its preference for maids and butlers in the home? Such 
a shift in taste might more represent the harvesting of the fruit of past increases in 
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productivity rather than a productivity slowdown per se: since it emerges from the free 
choice of consumers, it would be difficult, in orthodox economics, to identify such a 
deceleration in measured productivity growth with any decline in the rate of improvement 
in general welfare.11 And if the shift taking place were in the direction of the labour 
intensive, low productivity education sector whose output is registered at cost in the 
national accounts, could we simply be miscalculating the long term effects on productivity? 
‘If our contemporary obsessions with “the” growth rate had then been in place [in Japan 
after 1868], would not an imaginary pre-First World War IMF have called for less investment 
in school facilities in Japan and more in silk production?’ (Auerbach, 2016, p. 290) It will be 
suggested below that such misunderstanding about the long term productive effects of 
increased expenditure on education might apply as well to such items of ‘consumption’ as 
improved housing facilities for households on lower income. 
GDP has a third use as a tool in macroeconomic regulation - as a measure of aggregate 
demand. From this perspective, a productivity slowdown can generate a crisis by reducing 
incentives for investment from the private sector, which then acts to frustrate goals such as 
the maintenance of full employment. Wolf’s story concerning the crisis emerging from 
declining productivity growth, like that of others, is largely an amalgam of the (quite 
different) economic capacity and aggregate demand perspectives, but most analysts are 
united in declaring that this decline is a (very) bad thing, except for those, from a seemingly 
opposite perspective, are bewailing the fact that we are all about to be displaced by robots. 
The aggregate demand story may, in fact, play a bigger role than first appears in explaining 
this negative attitude: if one were merely concerned with declining productivity because of 
its effects on slowing GDP growth from a welfare and/or capacity perspective, one could, in 
fact, treat such a development in a positive manner: ‘declare victory’ and suggest that the 
economy, having successfully exhausted the stock of important and useful inventions, can 
now focus on social improvement through redistribution of resources in the context of a 
nineteenth century vision of a steady-state economy. But the near unanimity with which 
this declining productivity story is greeted by economists as a catastrophic event suggests 
the fear that this decline will result in the drying up of ‘animal spirits’ in the business 
community, leading to reduced investment and secular stagnation: ‘Capital deepening is 
indirectly influenced by technological change because firms’ investment decisions respond 
to improvements in capital’s current or expected marginal product’. (Brynjolfsson et al., 
2017) The possibility of a soft landing or steady state has never been on the cards for most 
economists.12  
Attempts at analysing national trends in productivity also take place through the 
examination of individual sectors. The ideal would be to get as close as possible to a hand’s-
on physical calculation - counting how many more widgets are produced with a given 
amount of labour when new widget-making machines are introduced, taking into 
consideration, as noted above, the possibility of qualitative differences from the existing 
output, and the need to set a value on the output of new commodities in the context of 
technological change (this problem was an acute one in the context of the Soviet machine 
tool sector mentioned above). The introduction of the new machines is unlikely to be a 
ceteris paribus event – it may well be accompanied by changes in work routines and 
practices in the sector under consideration that, in principle, are not to be viewed as rises in 
productivity per se, such as work intensification. And once we choose to examine changes in 
productivity one sector at a time, we must be wary of complications due to Marshallian-
type externalities, so that, for instance, an exclusive focus on increases in productivity in the 
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agricultural sector may distract us from tracing this rise to its true provenance - 
improvements in the electronics of machine tools used in the making of tractors, or 
developments in information technology the true (or joint) source of higher measured 
productivity in the financial sector. (Triplett and Bosworth, 2004, pp.29-31) Tracing such 
inter-sectoral connections, however, takes us away from the relative hand’s-on simplicity of 
the sectoral approach and introduces the value-based complications of global measures.  
But whatever the limitations of sectoral analysis, any location of a long term decline in 
the growth rate in productivity of the economy as a whole will be more convincingly found 
in the analysis of individual sectors than from aggregative statistics on trends in national 
productivity. And sectoral studies (e.g. Byrne et al., 2017), largely focusing on digital 
information and communications technologies (ICT), find declines in productivity growth 
even when correcting official figures for mismeasurement, including underestimates of price 
declines in high tech components. (Byrne, et al., 2016)13 The problematic calculations of 
declining marginal productivity growth at the global (i.e. US national) level have thus been 
reinforced by comparable trends at the sectoral level in high tech industries, with a general 
consensus that a decline in productivity growth is indeed present. The question arises – is it 
appropriate to identify increases in productivity and, indeed, material standards of living, 
with ‘innovations’, identified in contemporary discussions with the activities of high tech 
industries?   
 
Innovation and the trajectory of economic development 
The dogma that ‘innovation… is almost everything’ in the search for productivity 
improvements, is so widespread that it becomes an almost inescapable truism: who can 
doubt that our present-day standard of living is the product of thunderbolts from the past - 
the steam engine, the electric motor, the semiconductor and so on? Without, at this point, 
questioning the proposition that the ultimate provenance of material improvement lies in 
these great innovations, let us consider whether, as an empirical proposition, innovations 
track straightforwardly with improvements in material prosperity in general, and specifically 
whether, in Schumpeterian fashion, these innovations have a provenance in capitalist, 
profit-making enterprises.   
For the beginning of the twentieth century, a relatively straightforward version of a 
story affirming both of these propositions is easy to sustain – the US was the leader in rates 
of growth in GDP and GDP per capita, as well as being the home of the profit-making 
capitalist firms from which the flood of innovations came forth. An important contribution 
to these developments had been European achievements in engineering and science in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but the harvesting of these achievements as full-
fledged innovations took place predominantly through the aegis of large capitalist firms in 
the US, and secondarily in Imperial Germany. Contemporary economic observers largely 
overlooked the unprecedented developments that we now dub the Second Industrial 
Revolution: economic orthodoxy, as epitomised by Marshall (1922), continued to perceive 
the well-functioning capitalist economy through a nineteenth century focus on open 
markets and free trade, with firms acting as passive respondents to changes in demand and 
technology. It is not until very late in the day (see, for example, Romer, 1990) that a 
literature on the ‘new economic growth’ succeeded in integrating the notion of capitalist 
firms as focal points of innovation into mainstream economics.14  
More troublesome is the post Second World War period for explaining the 
relationship between innovation and economic growth - the golden age of capitalism from 
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the late 1940s to the early-mid 1970s. In fact, dramatic innovation played little role in the 
rapid growth across the capitalist world during the golden age. In the context of our 
present-day presumption that innovation is, uniquely, the fuel for economic growth and can 
be tautologically identified with technological change, (Byrne et al., 2016 and Bloom et al., 
2017) note that the major venues for expansion during this rapid period of growth were 
technologies that were all up and running in the inter-war period such as consumer 
electronics (including television), chemical engineering (including chemical fertilizer), 
electrification and the associated electrical consumer goods, and the internal combustion 
engine, including devices used for agricultural expansion and development; antibiotics and 
jet aircraft were perhaps the two leading novel technologies. The exceptional economic 
growth that took place during the golden age was within the framework of established 
technologies, not only in recovering Europe, but in the US as well. It is thus highly 
questionable whether, in this period covering many decades, it is possible to assert that 
innovations track straightforwardly with improvements in material prosperity in a direct line 
of causation. On the contrary, the economic events in this period would appear to be more 
consistent with movement in the opposite, Keynesian or Verdoorn’s law direction, by which 
a successfully functioning macroeconomic environment led to high rate of growth in 
productivity even in the absence of substantial innovation. 
Furthermore, it can also be questioned whether, in the Schumpeterian manner, 
great innovations invariably have a provenance in capitalist, profit-making enterprises: the 
post Second World War period differs from that of the early twentieth century in the 
difficulty we find in linking many key innovations, in a straightforward way, to the activities 
of individual capitalist firms. The quintessence of modern innovation - the electronics 
revolution epitomised by the invention of the transistor (semiconductor) in 1947 - only 
began to have important economic repercussions in the US civilian economy in the period of 
relative stagnation beginning in the 1970s. And contrary to the notion of innovation having 
its provenance in capitalist animal spirits and the profit-seeking activities of firms (with the 
transistor emerging from the motivations of the near-monopoly phone company AT&T), the 
historical reality locates the earliest and perhaps crucial developments in semiconductors, 
and the electronics sector in general, to state, security-driven motivations from the US 
Department of Defense, and then a complex series of interactions between the state and 
profit making firms that led to the explosive development of the electronics industry. The 
important and continuing role for the state and other non-profit driven entities15 in the 
electronics revolution and in other post war innovatory technologies, in contrast with the 
period at the beginning of the twentieth century, is not fortuitous – it has been driven by a 
form of market failure (i.e. the inability of the profit-driven free market to function 
appropriately) because of the growing role of ‘science’ (objective and reproducible ideas 
and protocols) in the invention and fabrication of new commodities and modes of work, as 
opposed to ‘craft’ (ideas and procedures embodied in individuals and specific institutions). 
Scientific developments are (practically by definition) more easily appropriated than craft 
skills by outsiders with sufficient intellectual preparation, a fact that can inhibit research 
linked to fundamental innovation by profit-making firms and has inserted the state and 
other non-profit driven entities into this role in the post Second World War environment in 
a wide variety of scientific and technological fields: it is progressively more unlikely that 
innovations of a fundamental kind will emerge from privately-owned, profit-making entities. 
The alienable nature of the (ever-growing) scientific component in technological 
development also helps to explain the growing centrality of disputes concerned with 
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intellectual property rights and the desperate attempts on the part of firms and nations to 
protect ‘their’ technology.  
The misleading formulations of Joseph Schumpeter have emerged as a kind of a 
placeholder for the process of innovation in mainstream economics, hoisting him to the 
status of the ‘prophet of innovation’, perhaps in embarrassment at the decades-long failure 
of the mainstream literature to concede that a Second Industrial Revolution had indeed 
taken place and to confront the consequences of this revolution for the process of 
innovation. This embracing of Schumpeter has involved an identification of innovation and 
technological improvement with discontinuous change. Schumpeter’s approach to 
innovation is that ‘it [is]… a "big" step and a "big" change’. (Schumpeter, 1939, p.101) The 
range of notions described as Schumpeterian are seemingly radical, but implicitly embody 
the orthodox neoclassical textbook presumption that all production takes place on the 
efficiency frontier,16 with inputs being used optimally from the full range of available 
technological possibilities (a presupposition embodied in standard regression technique).17 
The statistical residual, this ‘measure of our ignorance’ which is often identified with 
Schumpeterian discontinuous innovation (see Bryne et al., 2016 and Bloom et al., 2017) 
swallows up a range of alternative sources of improvement. Given the fact that ‘No engineer 
goes to the trouble and expense of developing techniques which he is certain will prove 
uneconomic’, (Salter, 1969, p.14) much technological change does not take the form of a 
Schumpeterian thunderbolt – the setting up of a new production function - but is a mere 
substitution of one factor for another; (Rosenberg, 1976, pp.63-5) higher productivity may 
also emerge from Verdoorn’s law considerations of economies of scale and learning by 
doing. Even more fundamentally, the presumption that an economy is operating on the 
frontier of its production function implicitly involves a denial of the possibility that sectors of 
an economy are using their existing resources and technology with less than optimal 
efficiency, a notion little in keeping with the economic history of industrial sectors and one 
that precludes the possibility that administrative and organisational reforms (the 
introduction of containerisation; the just-in time inventory system) might substantially 
enhance efficiency even in the absence of significant technological change.  
The great majority of countries have been faced with the task of the assimilation and 
adaptation of new technologies, rather than their innovation: the US perspective of the 
necessity for innovation on the technological frontier acts perhaps as a distorting mirror in 
this regard. Wolf’s use of statistics on trends in US productivity to serve as a surrogate for, 
presumably, world-wide developments in the limits of contemporary technology is likely to 
become increasingly deceptive with the emergence of important centres of such activity in 
other nations, as well as the difficulties of tracing, for instance, the national provenance of a 
technological innovation from a Swiss subsidiary of a US multinational such as IBM. But even 
in the case of indubitable cases of innovation, it is doubtful that the Schumpeterian image of 
a ‘bombardment’ from a large scale firm, (Schumpeter, 1943, pp.84-5) with its treacherous 
notion of creative destruction, is a useful one. One would think that the emergence of the 
semiconductor described above would be a quintessential example of a Schumpeterian 
innovation, but the substantive history deviates in crucial ways from the Schumpeterian 
archetype.18 AT&T followed the Schumpeterian script by being an almost complete 
monopolist in the US phone business, but it was run, not by an entrepreneur, but by 
professional managers; the developmental phase of the semiconductor evidenced a further 
departure from strict Schumpeterian orthodoxy in the central role played by ferocious 
competition among firms and the substantial role played by state funding and direction. 
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Most significantly in the present context, the emergence of this general purpose technology 
(alongside the steam engine and electricity), far from being an explosive, discontinuous 
Schumpeterian event, had important elements of ‘ordinary’ economic activity involving the 
continuous diffusion of new techniques and learning by doing, with the new semiconductor 
sector building on the protocols, procedures, practical skills and intellectual capital of a 
range of existent industrial activities,19 including an electronics industry built upon vacuum 
tubes (British: valves); the vacuum tube sector continued to exist alongside the newer one 
for several decades, suggesting that the change might be dubbed creative displacement 
rather than creative destruction.  
Wolf and others are concerned with the relationship between the rate of change of 
productivity and the growth rate in GDP in time frames stretching over decades.20 Once we 
depart from the Schumpeterian notion of discontinuous, Promethean innovation 
bequeathed to us by an entrepreneurial elite, we must give consideration to the 
infrastructural, institutional, intellectual and human contexts in which economic change 
takes place; such considerations may well play a decisive role in determining what kinds of 
public policy should be pursued, as we shall see below. Britain as the focal point of the First 
Industrial Revolution and the US of the Second shared certain characteristics in common in 
their respective periods (i.e. the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries): both were 
already high wage (and cheap energy) economies at the time of the initiation of their 
revolutions, suggesting the substitution of capital for high priced labour as a motivation for 
revolutions embodying labour-saving, high productivity forms of production; both were 
unified states with central governments possessing unquestioned sovereign power.(Allen, 
2009) Certain differences emerge at the level of human capital development, with the mind-
set, if not the intellectual attainments of entrepreneurial class in Britain reflecting, at least 
indirectly, the nation’s central role in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, 
while the laggard position of the US in pure science through the early twentieth century 
meant that, in certain industries such as electrical machinery, foreign personnel inevitably 
played an important role. Educated elite groups may have played a disproportionate role in 
the adaptation of utterly new conceptions in the First industrial Revolution in Britain 
(Mokyr, 2011) and in the extraordinarily rapid adaptation of western science and technology 
in Japan after 1868. In the great majority of cases in the modern world, however, societies 
are charged with the adaptation and diffusion of techniques developed elsewhere, so that a 
focus on the development of a technological elite, as opposed to a broad-based human and 
institutional infrastructure, may be inappropriate.  
Both Britain and the US inherited highly developed infrastructures of craftspeople 
and technicians from their pre-revolution periods, often from guild and guild-like 
institutions. (Epstein and Prak, 2008) A decisive departure from previous developments 
takes place in the Second Industrial Revolution, with the US (along with Imperial Germany) 
being at the forefront of mass, state-financed education, public policy initiatives that played 
a key role in the provisioning of personnel needed in the newly emergent forms of 
production but, perhaps even more significantly, for the staffing of bureaucracies in 
government and large firms, as well as in the burgeoning tertiary sector. In the post Second 
World War period, the unprecedented expansion in the US of higher education in all 
disciplines included a significant compensation for previous deficits in pure science and 
mathematics, one sufficient to make US universities and associated institutions the world 
centres of this range of disciplines.  
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Can we conclude that ‘innovation… is almost everything’ in the search for 
productivity improvements? Such a proposition can be asserted tautologically, but is a 
deceptive guide to the substantive history of economic development and may lead, as noted 
below, to an inordinate, and overly narrow fixation on productivity growth and the elixir of 
high technology. The historical record described above concerning the new general purpose 
technology based on the semiconductor emerged in the context of previous and 
concomitant broad-based commitments to high levels of institutional and human 
development in the US. This technology, based on the new physics of late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Europe and the technological accomplishments of existing sectors in 
the US and elsewhere, was initially created to satisfy the practical needs of a great US 
monopoly, AT&T, for new switching devices for its telephone networks. We then observe 
the extraordinarily rapid overcoming of obstacles to the development and maturation of 
this technology by activities directed and financed by the US Department of Defense (DOD) 
for the purpose of creating weapons of mass destruction and little else: the transistor-based 
IBM mainframe computer emerged only in the 1960s, and the pioneering use of 
semiconductors in consumer electronics largely emanated from Japan. Having been 
invented and developed to serve the rather specific needs of AT&T and the DOD, it is only in 
the 1970s that the semiconductor-based electronics sector emerged as the source of a new 
general purpose technology, comparable to the steam engine and electricity, with 
applications in all aspects of the economy and society. This unexpected, even serendipitous 
set of developments has lent itself, as we shall see below, to the cultivation of a Teflon-
moon shot myth, by which high tech developments have, invariably, salutary unintended 
consequences, promoting the notion that the magnitude of energy and effort devoted to 
high tech pursuits is of greater significance than whether the goals pursued are inherently 
socially desirable.   
 
Is there ‘no alternative’? 
 Let us recapitulate the mainstream consensus on the issues under consideration: 
growth in productivity is ‘everything’; the source of productivity growth is technological 
innovation (most likely emerging from profit-making enterprises), and the leading nations 
need to focus upon, and direct their efforts to, the development of high technology sectors. 
A response to this admirably succinct, coherent but utterly deceptive set of propositions 
will, of necessity, be a complex one. The notion that growth in productivity is ‘everything’ is, 
as we shall see below, an example of analysts being subject to capture by the very tools 
used to help focus their research efforts. The second proposition is that the source of 
productivity gains lay in discontinuous innovation (invariably identified in the contemporary 
literature with technological change), for which, it is suggested, there is little substitute: if 
we are on the frontier of the production function, there is no other ready source for 
improvement. In contrast to such a view, presented above is an indubitable case of 
innovation, the emergence of the post-war electronics industry in the US based on the 
semiconductor. This history has its list of elite heroes, but demonstrates, even in this 
paradigmatic case of innovation, the thin line between the process of innovation and that of 
diffusion. The latter aspect, especially, underlines the importance of broadly-based 
development of appropriate institutions, especially those related to human development (in 
the case of the US, its unparalleled university sector) and the presence of an appropriate 
infrastructure. Thus, the new semiconductor-based industry was built upon the human 
infrastructure and skills already in place in now obsolescent obsolete sectors such as 
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vacuum tube manufacture. Rather than perceiving such sectors in the context of a hollowing 
out process of Schumpeterian creative destruction and bombardment, in which the labour 
embodied in such sectors is treated as a malleable commodity to be reallocated in this 
process of destruction, we can view this stock of labour, and the skills embodied in this 
labour, both individually and as a collectivity, as valued assets. 
Drawing a line between the successful modification or adaptation of an older technology 
and the introduction of a new one is often difficult. The present-day enthusiasm for 
Schumpeter’s seemingly radical focus on discontinuous technical change is one that 
preserves the standard dichotomy between an existent technology, for which a full set of 
blueprints is available, and an utterly new one. The awkward possibility of shades of grey – 
that economic outcomes are critically affected by the extent to which firms and societies 
successfully adapt to existent technologies – poses the possibility that the links between 
education and economic growth might not simply flow through the creation of new 
technologies (by, invariably, a small subset of the population), but are a function of the 
efficaciousness and creativity with which the society as a whole responds to these changes, 
or even to the more mundane challenges of maintaining and supervising of existing 
technologies, tasks which apparently consume the great majority of even academically 
trained engineers. (Edgerton, 2008, pp.100-102)  
At a popular level, the innovative entrepreneur – James Dyson in the UK or Steve Jobs in 
the US – functions symbolically as the economy’s saviour, returning the nation to its former 
unchallenged position. This cult of techno-nationalism ‘assumes that the key unit of analysis 
for the study of technology is the nation: nations are the units that invent, have R&D 
budgets, cultures of innovation, that diffuse, that use technology. The success of nations, it 
is believed by techno-nationalists, is dependent on how well we do this’. (Edgerton, 2008, 
p.105) This is an odd fixation in the age of the multinational.21 Simplistic notions of technical 
change as the source of material progress founder on the historical reality that, at both the 
national and individual level, the appropriation of these gains is a highly contingent matter. 
Thus, the post-World War II electronics revolution had its provenance in the US (and to a 
minor extent in Britain and the Soviet Union), but the successful adaptation of some aspects 
of these developments in Japan and then other nations in the Far East resulted in the virtual 
elimination of the production of mass consumer electronics in the US and the UK, with Asian 
nations cornering the bulk of world manufacture. This example reminds us that an over-
much focus on gains from new technology may distract attention from other forms of 
national economic advantage gained from human intelligence, such as facility in design, or 
complementary forms of creativity, such as the managerial successes in quality control of 
Japanese manufacture. These manifestations of creative intelligence, unless associated with 
a specific patent or copyright, are likely to be precluded from consideration in, especially, 
statistical calculations, given the presumption of universal best practice in the use of existing 
technologies. 
Returning to the primary proposition that growth in productivity is ‘everything’, note 
that it embodies the strong presumption that the source of this productivity growth will be 
(technological) innovation: if indeed we are functioning on the efficiency frontier, high tech 
is the only likely source of improvement. Thus, in the case of the US health care industry, 
with its grotesquely high costs and mediocre outcomes,(Commonwealth Fund, 2017) we are 
enticed with the benefits of enhanced productivity from a host of high tech innovations - 
large-scale data sharing, clinical decision support systems that use artificial intelligence and 
telemedicine, (Branstetter and Sichel, 2017) rather than the less exciting, and more 
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contentious issues surrounding the high prices paid for pharmaceuticals, inflated 
administrative expenses and exceptional remuneration of doctors.  
In a whole range of cases, we observe social decision-makers seeking a technological 
elixir to overcome social and economic difficulties.22 In the Soviet Union of the 1980s, with 
its rusty buses and generally low standard of material life, the press was full of fantasies on 
the possible use of the latest technologies to leap over failures in the ordinary provision of 
goods and services, sometimes opining that the new computer technologies (which were 
emerging in capitalist countries) could at last make possible the production of a rationally 
calculated central plan: such a notion implicitly embodied a rather mechanical view of 
Marxian value theory, by which the costs for goods and services in the Soviet economy 
could be used, as in capitalist orthodoxy, as the basis for plan calculation. (see Auerbach and 
Sotiropoulos, 2014) Even without such an ideological underpinning, British Rail made a 
desperate attempt in the 1980s to introduce high speed trains in the context of a 
nineteenth century infrastructure and roadbed by using innovative solutions that enabled 
trains to tilt as they entered bends on the ancient track, (BBC News, 2015) a project that 
was ultimately unsuccessful. A last example involves the notion, currently fashionable, that 
developing countries in, for instance, Africa, can generalise their success in the adaptation 
of the mobile phone to harness contemporary technologies to ‘leapfrog’ over deficits in 
infrastructure. A recent report in the Financial Times is dubious: ‘Some see in the power of 
technology an almost miraculous potential to solve problems that many governments, 
particularly in Africa, have failed properly to address; poor health, poor schools, lack of 
roads, lack of electricity and lack of jobs.’ (Pilling, 2018)  
What all of these examples have in common is the search for a technological elixir as an 
extrication from dysfunction and failure. And indeed, in the context of pressing world 
problems, it would be difficult to object to ceteris paribus alleviation in the form of 
technological manna dropped from heaven. Medical developments in the twentieth century 
are often upheld as primary instances of such ‘magic bullets’, with the story often retold 
that not even a Nathan Rothschild could be saved from dying of an infected abscess in 1836. 
This dramatic exemplification of the efficacy of modern medical science is somewhat 
neutralised by the historical reality that the great bulk of improvements in health and 
longevity since the time of Rothschild’s death have been due to sanitation, nutrition and 
general aspects of economic development rather than high tech medical breakthroughs: 
infrastructural changes rather than magic bullets. (Fogel, 2004) In the context of the acute 
and urgent considerations surrounding climate change, it is impossible to avoid hoping that 
some technological breakthrough will solve or at least alleviate what appears to be an 
emergent catastrophe. (see, for instance Gabbatiss, 2018) But pursuing each of these 
possible paths to dealing with climate change until viability can be attained is costly. More 
importantly, a focus on technological breakthroughs as the sole path for dealing with 
climate change can offer the excuse, which many are eager to seize, that one can simply 
postpone dealing with the issue, since the implementation of strategies using existent 
technology are likely to be painful, involving various forms of consumption restriction.23 
In our time, high technology functions as an elixir. In a popular literature emanating 
from the US and elsewhere, technology will solve social conundrums ranging from slow 
economic growth to obesity and climate change. The present-day rhetoric surrounding 
productivity growth is intimately linked to the mystique of the GPT: the electronics 
revolution had its origins in attempts to deal with concrete problems - the need for 
switching devices at AT&T and to facilitate the construction of weapons of mass destruction 
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at the DOD. What emerged, however, was a general purpose technology which, like the 
steam engine and electricity, could engender productivity growth in all aspects of the 
economy.  
With the emergence of this universal remedy,24 we are only one step away from the 
Teflon-moon shot myth, (Emsley,1994) by which the pursuit of ambitious high tech projects 
(e.g. the 1969 moon landing) will have, invariably, favourable by-products (e.g. the myth 
that it led to the development of Teflon), promoting the notion that the magnitude of 
energy and effort devoted to high tech pursuits is of greater significance than whether the 
goals pursued are inherently socially desirable. In our post neoliberal age, such a stance can 
involve leaving the electronics industry to pursue market-based projects (as described 
above), even of a frivolous nature, with the hope (as I suspect Professor Goolsbee implicitly 
holds) that solutions to pressing issues such as climate change will emerge as a by-product. 
But since this new technology has emerged since the Second World War by way of public 
financing, should there not be a substantial element of public direction in the application of 
this technology (besides its use in the creation of weapons of mass destruction)? There is a 
tendency to treat new technology as a Promethean, uncontrollable force, one that is, at 
best, passively responsive to marketplace consumer demands, but not to public needs. Such 
notions do not correspond to the historical development of the electronics industry, which 
put in place, and successfully fulfilled, the concrete tasks before it (the development of 
switching devices; weapons), with by-products, only some of which were ‘unintended 
consequences’, emerging over decades. Why not channel the creative energies of this sector 
to socially desirable ends such as climate change alleviation and education, rather than 
treating any such developments as the fortunate, but accidental by-product of pursuits 
undertaken for other reasons?  
 
Some final comments 
Perhaps we need to reconsider why such a high priority is placed on productivity growth 
and hence innovation in the first place:  
i. Slow productivity growth limits resources that will be available for low 
productivity sectors; 
ii. Rises in GDP/per capita resulting from productivity growth are 
inherently beneficial from a welfare perspective; 
iii. Aggregate demand considerations – slow productivity growth 
constrains the incentive for investment that leads to growth. In this 
case, the problem is not that a lack of productivity growth is due to 
insufficient investment, but the reverse: insufficient productivity 
growth is perceived as having a dampening effect on ‘animal spirits’ 
and therefore on investment and therefore aggregate demand. 
 
In addition, however, I would add the following possibilities: 
iv. A major reason (voiced sotto voce) for being concerned about a 
productivity slowdown is that we (i.e. the US, or the west) are in a 
race with ‘them’ (whoever they are): we have to keep up;  
v. Are we simply mesmerised by our own measurements, which have 
taken on a life of their own? 
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An exclusive focus on productivity growth can lead to paralysis while awaiting 
technological manna from heaven, or focus energies in the direction of activities that 
register as ‘productive’ (i.e. will lead to growth in GDP per capita). The interaction of points 
iv and v above has registered in recent public policy discussions in the US, when opponents 
of environmental regulations, in the context of international competition, note the 
deleterious effects that these regulations might have on rates of growth in GDP per capita. 
An important contribution from the environmental literature, however, suggests that the 
latter notion may simply be based on a miscalculation of GDP as a measure of economic 
capacity. Any proper calculation of GDP and productivity must incorporate appropriate 
deductions for the degradation of the natural environment due to economic activity, just as 
firms must make an allowance for the depreciation of their capital in the calculation of their 
profits. (OECD,2014) And a range of enhancements to material life will not register 
productivity improvements at all.25 In some cases, as suggested above, public action in 
increasingly unequal societies that is perceived to be purely ‘distributional’ (i.e. without 
effect upon GDP), such as improved housing facilities for households on lower incomes, may 
not only be intrinsically desirable but, in addition, have long term positive effects on the 
productive capacity of the households involved.  
It would be a serious error, however, to find hidden sources of productivity growth in all 
forms of desirable social action such as increases in the quantity and quality of human 
resources devoted to care to the elderly, doctors’ training in human interaction with 
patients and intensified tuition for students in social and political citizenship. The inordinate 
focus on the growth-innovation nexus (‘Economic growth arises from people creating ideas 
[i.e. research]’ Bloom et al., 2017) will direct effort and attention towards, for instance, of 
new technical devices for improving the delivery of recorded music to consumers, diverting 
resources from ‘unproductive’ expenditure on music tuition in schools to raise the quality of 
the music itself; longevity (a statistic not registering in GDP or productivity) might well be 
enhanced with greater efficacy through low tech social action to encourage better nutrition 
than high tech medical research. 
Obviously, an over-riding of the declining effectiveness of Moore’s law, or a 
technological fix to problems related to climate change would not be unwelcome. But rather 
than thinking about technological innovation as a magical elixir for solving problems (from 
weight loss to slowdown in GDP growth), perhaps we should think of it as part of the range 
of rational strategies that a society might use to cope with the problems confronting it. 
Thus, a reliance on technological change, as in point iii above, as a mechanism for 
stimulating animal spirits, may suggest that economists have no strategy for the 
maintenance of full employment except to await the next technological upsurge, a sad 
confession if true.26 In broader terms, the panic over a productivity slowdown should be 
seen in the context of a need to reconceptualise the meaning of ‘development’, with rich 
countries re-examining - what should be our maximand? What is a ‘good life’, a ‘good 
society’? These are not idle questions. There are particular dangers for poor countries 
whose strategy of development for the 21th century cannot merely retrace existing paths 
(largely concerned with industrialisation and the employment flowing from it) that may well 
not exist in the second half of the century. There is a need for a conceptualisation of 
development that involves something other than chasing productivity, one that embodies 
the human dimension as both a means and an end. 
What then is the source of alarm surrounding a slowing down of the productivity growth 
rate? One seems to be an inordinate focus and hope for replication of developments in the 
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1990s in the US, where the coming on stream of a host of applications of the electronics 
revolution boosted growth to significantly higher levels than were evidenced before or after 
this period. In the context of a structure of income distribution so weighed against the great 
mass of potential consumers, is it (perhaps implicitly) postulated that a long term aggregate 
demand-based expansion is unlikely, and that only the descent of technological manna from 
heaven can sustain successful long term outcomes? 
An additional element, however, is the spectre of productivity enhancement taking on a 
life of its own as a welfare criterion. In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, 
Schadenfreude in the direction of those who, in 2004 (mentioned above) praised the 
productivity gains of the US financial sector come easily. But evaluation of gains in the retail 
sector, the largest single contributor to the resurgence of US productivity growth in the 
1990s, (Triplett and Bosworth, 2004, p.233) raises more difficult questions. Thus, for Decker 
et al., (2014) the key question is whether the productivity enhancing change from the exit of 
low productivity ‘Mom and Pop’ stores and their replacement by higher productivity stores 
from large, national chains ‘has been more in terms of subsistence or transformational 
entrepreneurs’. We see here an exclusive focus on productivity considerations, first upon 
the gains to consumers due to the enhanced productivity of the ‘big box’ retailers such as 
Walmart and then upon the effect of these changes on the composition of the 
entrepreneurial class. Gordon (2016, p.243), while noting that consumer gains may in fact 
be understated because of an ‘outlet substitution bias’ in the calculation of the consumer 
price index, permits a more negative interpretation to be placed on these developments 
that ‘[drive] local businesses into bankruptcy, [eliminate] jobs of people who might be 
forced to shift from the freedom of individual proprietorship to the minimum-wage non-
union work environment of Walmart.’ There are, furthermore, some passing hints (p.370) 
that these car-oriented developments have played a role in the wrecking of city and town 
centres. These objections, however, are too weak to challenge the centrality of productivity 
considerations, or to permit alternatives involving the planning of living space that might 
interfere with these ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ developments emanating from the Hayekian 
free market spontaneous order. We thus find that an international discourse centred round 
productivity, with origins largely in the US, yields ‘objective’ guidance on the rational 
organisation of land use and living space that just happens to conform with common 
practice in the US: there is no alternative. 
With productivity enhancement taking on a life of its own as a welfare criterion, we find 
a central focus on the GPT of the age, the electronics sector, with the cargo cult-like hope 
that it can help us extricate ourselves from contemporary dilemmas. Such an approach 
evidences a lack of faith in social action. Substantial intervention from a GPT, is in 
Schumpeterian terms, a discontinuous, event, rather than part of the range of ‘normal’ 
improvements to material life (including ‘normal’ tech change) that a healthy society 
manifests in the context of solving the real problems before it. The chimera of a productivity 
slowdown is linked to a cry for help and exists alongside the seemingly contrary notion of an 
exhaustion of jobs due to AI. It is maintained not only at this emotional level, but is also 
buried in the cold, analytical structure of most economic analysis and research, which 
presumes that we are already functioning on the efficiency frontier of the economy, so that 
there is little else to do but await a technological elixir.  
This assertion of inexorable laws in the economy has a parallel in macroeconomics. In 
2007, the then former head of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, was asked for whom 
he was voting for president. He suggested that it didn’t matter who was elected because, 
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thanks to globalisation, policy decisions have been replaced by market forces. (Tooze, 2018, 
p.574) For Greenspan, the Ayn Rand free marketeer, this lack of freedom action was (as it is 
for all cult members) a desirable state. For the rest of us, the recognition that the assertion 
of ‘there is no alternative’ should be seen for what it is - a political stance - no matter how 
wrapped it is in scientific garb of a microeconomic or macroeconomic kind. There are indeed 
constraints on our actions, both individually and collectively, but the creation of false 
dilemmas and non-existent obstacles are a distraction from dealing with the problems 
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1 An unavoidable complication to this simple concept is the fact that increases in output might take 
the form of the production of commodities with qualitative differences from existing ones, or of 
commodities not previously existing.   
2 There has also emerged a Great Divergence literature that examines why western Europe rather 
than in China (Pomeranz, 2001) or India (Yazdani, 2017) rose to economic predominance in the early 
modern period.   
3 Even here, issues can arise on the ‘correct’ prices to be attached to the machines. Wassily 
Leontief’s famous input-output tables, the most prominent examples of attempts to represent an 
economy empirically in terms of its underlying productive relationships, rely on (market) price 
weights both within and between sectors for their construction. 
4 Labour inputs must be weighted for qualitative differences in skills, and typically, it is thought that 
wages should be expected ‘to move closely with marginal products’, (Bosler et al., 2016) a 
presumption partially supported in the literature, (Autor et al., 2008) but one lending itself to 
problems of endogeneity and circularity. (In the case of CEO-to-worker compensation, we have 
witnessed in the US a movement from 20 to 1 in 1965, 58 to 1 in 1989, 344 to 1 in 2000 to 312 to 1 
in 2017 (Mishel and Schieder, 2018): such extraordinary stretching and gyration of relativities in 
remuneration gainsay the notion that these changes are anchored on anything as fundamental and 
stable as relative productivities.) An alternative approach to attaching weights to labour quality that 
avoids these problems includes an adjustment to the number of workers in the statistical analysis 
incorporating, among other variables, their years of schooling: (World Bank, 2000) such a procedure 
runs into the difficulty of how crudely the latter measure approximates improvements in academic 
achievement. (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008) 
5 Perhaps even more contentious is the question of the measurement of capital, which has a long 
history and notorious list of problems, both theoretical and practical. Here I will mention only some 
of the latter issues. First, researchers in this area invariably have to rely on company statistics for the 
evaluation of tangible capital, which is traditionally calculated using historic cost valuations; 
complications emerge with the presence of capital of different technological vintages, as well as 
distortions in the measurement of historical trends with progressive modifications in recent decades 
of historic cost procedures to accommodate notions of replacement cost and net realisable value. 
The second, and perhaps the most pressing contemporary issue relates to intangible capital 
investment in areas such as healthcare, robotics and education, (Branstetter and Sichel, 2017) where 
evaluation of much of the new intangible capital such as AI, datasets, firm-specific human capital, 
and new business processes is difficult to quantify on the basis of traditional historic or replacement 
cost procedures: valuations will proceed on the basis of the stream of net revenues that this 
intangible investment is likely to yield, though such procedures will tend to capture returns that 
would otherwise lodge with residual TFP and therefore obviate the latter calculation. (Brynjolfsson 
et al., 2017) Most especially in a world of services, the creation of a work-force of ‘productive’, 
knowledgeable labour (e.g. nurses in an ageing population) is not merely complementary to working 
with technology, but is the essence of the job, in contexts in which gains in human welfare are often 
hard to quantify and may not register as increases in GDP. 
6 A general critique of this ‘growth accounting’ approach can be found in Auerbach (2016), Chapter 
6. 
7 See Field (2011), Chapter 7 for historical movements in the US. Note that the levels of TPF growth 
in the 1930s (i.e. 1929 to 1941) were distinctively high in the recovery period 1934 to 1936 and 
during the war preparation-based recovery 1939 to 1941. 
8 The trend in the US towards a higher share of value added of national income in favour of capital as 
opposed to labour became a major issue of controversy when restated as a growing wage-
productivity gap. (Michel, 2018) This is perhaps indicative of the pungency of the notion of 
productivity in public discourse.   
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9 The problematic aspect of global productivity measures and their relationship to technological 
innovation may be illustrated by the fact that the US in the 1930s, ‘the most technologically 
progressive decade of the century’ (Field, 2003) in terms of inventions and patents granted, 
registered higher levels of TFP growth from 1929 to 1941 compared with 1948 to 1973 according to 
one measure, (Field, 2011, p.43) but substantially lower levels of increase in TFP compared with the 
later period when a correction is made for improvements in labour quality. (Bakker et al., 2016) The 
growth in the latter period, as noted below, was largely on the basis of developments, technological 
and otherwise, that were already up and running in the inter-war period or earlier.      
10 This distinction can be found in Byrne and Sichel (2017). 
11 Intersectoral movements do not appear in fact to be playing a decisive role in the present 
slowdown. (Byrne et al., 2016) 
12 Ironically, contrary to a present-day focus on productivity policy as a way of promoting macro 
success, it was justified in the UK in 1959 on the basis that macro success, i.e. full employment, had 
already been achieved. (Salter, 1969, p.1) 
13 Byrne et al. (2016) notes that ‘biases in semiconductor prices… [have] a very small effect on GDP 
because faster true growth of real value added in semiconductors is offset by smaller true growth of 
real value added in products using the semiconductors. Semiconductor bias only matters for GDP 
because of exports and imports.’ This observation underlines that while Wolf and others may use US 
productivity movements to trace world-wide trends, there are aspects of the measurements made 
(e.g. the levels of exports and imports) which are US specific, and may not be easy to generalise as 
indicative of a global trend. 
14 The Technocratic Planning Paradigm (TPP) of the early twentieth century (Auerbach, 2016, 
Chapter 3) imbibed far more of the spirit of the Second Industrial Revolution than did Marshallian 
orthodoxy, though it failed to give any special emphasis to the startling levels of innovation that 
were taking place. Only in a much later period do we see in Galbraith (1967) an attempt to integrate 
the TPP and notions from Schumpeter (to be discussed below) in a conception of planning and 
innovation as the central activities of the firm – a perspective that reached a sophisticated level of 
development in Nelson and Winter (1982); the classic historical exposition remains Chandler (1977). 
15 On the complex role of universities, science and economics, see Stephan (2012), especially 
Chapter 12. 
16 Note the contrast with Hayek (1949). 
17 Statistical tests have, in addition, a bias in favour of countable, clearly delineated measures of 
technological improvement (e.g. patents).  
18 The discussion here and below of the development of the semiconductor follows Auerbach (2016), 
Chapter 9. 
19 On the role of the culture of precision in the development of the electronics industry, see 
Winchester (2018), especially Chapter 9. 
20 TFP tends to move in tandem with economic activity because of labour hoarding by firms over the 
business cycle (Bhaumik, 2011) and, as suggested above, the tautological connection between 
measures of productivity and of economic activity. There is in fact a large ‘real business cycle’ 
literature that attempts to explain cyclical movements in terms of exogenous technological shocks 
(and therefore has links with Schumpeter, 1939) that will be put to one side here. 
21 In addition, locating ‘country of origin’ becomes increasingly difficult in the context of ubiquitous 
outsourcing by firms. (Smil, 2013, Chapter 1) 
22 Note the highly articulate critique in Sax (2018). 
23 See the review by Kolbert (2009) of climate change ‘solutions’ offered in Levitt and Dubner (2009). 
24 Whence the moronic expression from British journalism – ‘chips with everything’. 
25 Gordon (2016) lists a host of inventions for the period 1870 to 1940 which increased the quality of 
life far more than their contribution to GDP (e.g. p.242 the introduction of cars meant health 
benefits from the elimination of horse manure on streets). 
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26 Binswanger (2009) suggests the existence of a growth imperative in capitalist economies, with a 
zero growth economy not feasible in the long run. 
